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Abstract— For LTI control systems, we provide mathematical
tools – in terms of Linear Matrix Inequalities – for computing
outer ellipsoidal bounds on the reachable sets that attacks can
induce in the system when they are subject to the physical
limits of the actuators. Next, for a given set of dangerous
states, states that (if reached) compromise the integrity or safe
operation of the system, we provide tools for designing new
artificial limits on the actuators (smaller than their physical
bounds) such that the new ellipsoidal bounds (and thus the
new reachable sets) are as large as possible (in terms of volume)
while guaranteeing that the dangerous states are not reachable.
This guarantees that the new bounds cut as little as possible
from the original reachable set to minimize the loss of system
performance. Computer simulations using a platoon of vehicles
are presented to illustrate the performance of our tools.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security and privacy in cyber-physical systems (CPS) have
become a major concern in the control community due
to tight interaction between communication networks and
physical processes [1][2]. Several high-profile incidents such
as StuxNet [3], the 2016 breach of Ukrainian power grid [4],
as well as attacks on modern cars [5] have exposed a wide
range of vulnerabilities in CPS. As a consequence, the use
of control techniques to analyze the impact of cyber-attacks
and to design anomaly detection and mitigation tools have
drawn significant attention in recent years [6]-[15].
Most of the work on security analysis does not take into
account the physical constraints of actuators; however, it is
well known that constrained control actions have significant
implications in stability and reachability of control systems
[16]. Since actuators cannot inject arbitrarily large amounts
of energy into the system, there are always physical limita-
tions restricting the trajectories that actuators can induce. In
most physical dynamical systems actuator saturation arises
from these physical limits (e.g., the power that can be
injected to an electrical system; the acceleration possible
by an engine due to limited torque; the maximum flow rate
of an inlet pipe). From a control designer perspective, this
translates into a reachability problem: whether it is possible
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to drive the system from a initial state to a final state given
the actuator bounds.
On the other hand, from an attacker’s viewpoint and since
attacks on sensors or in control commands lead to anomalous
actuators actions, actuator bounds will tend to reduce the
adversary capabilities in terms of the states that can be
reached by the the attacker’s action. So the question arises:
given the actuator bounds, is it possible for the attacker to
drive the system to an undesired or dangerous state? That
is, given a set of unsafe states (i.e., the states where the
integrity or safe operation of the system is compromised)
D, is there a sequence of attacker actions that is capable of
driving the system state to D given the physical restrictions
on the actuators? This question reduces to identifying the
intersection between the attack-induced reachable set of
states and the dangerous state set D.
The contributions of this work are twofold. First, we ap-
proximate the reachable set induced by individually-bounded
control inputs. Because quantifying this exact set is mathe-
matically intractable, we turn to construct outer ellipsoidal
bounds of the reachable sets. We provide tools in terms of
Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs) to obtain tight ellipsoidal
bounds for the inherent actuator bounds, using an approach
similar to that in [17]. Second, we then formulate a design
strategy that determines artificial limits on actuators smaller
than their physical bounds to reduce the potential impact of
attackers on the behavior of the system. To avoid the trivial
(and useless) solution of setting the artificial bounds to zero
and to minimize the loss of system performance, we find
new input bounds that make the new reachable set as large
as possible without overlapping a given set of dangerous
states D. Effectively our goal is to maximize, through the
choice of new actuator bounds, the size of the reachable set
without intersecting with unsafe states. In lieu of maximizing
the actual reachable set, which is generally intractable, we
maximize the volume of the ellipsoidal bounds, phasing
this as a synthesis LMI. Intuitively, the ellipsoidal bound is
maximized until it touches but does not cross the boundary
of the dangerous states. Finally, we show the viability of our
approach in a vehicle platooning example subject to false-
data injection attacks.
II. BACKGROUND
We study Linear Time-Invariant (LTI) discrete-time sys-
tems with individually-bounded control inputs:
xk+1 = Fxk +Guk, (1)
with k ∈ N; state xk ∈ Rn; state matrix F ∈ Rn×n; input
matrix G ∈ Rn×m; and symmetrically bounded control input
ar
X
iv
:1
71
0.
02
57
6v
1 
 [c
s.S
Y]
  6
 O
ct 
20
17
uk ∈ Rm such that
[uk]
2
i ≤ γi, i = 1, . . . ,m, (2)
where γi > 0 is a constant which determines the bound
for the magnitude of each control input, i.e., [ξ]j is the jth
element of ξ.
Physical laws and energy constraints lead real control
systems to have practical limits on the actuators used to
steer the system dynamics. For example, a vehicle cannot
accelerate or decelerate infinitely fast; the engine and brakes
have limits. These limits imply a saturation in the mapping
from input signal to actuation (e.g., once the engine limit is
reached, increasing the throttle will not add more torque).
These are the input signal limitations modeled by γi.
Unmodeled disturbances propagate through a control sys-
tem until it comes to effect the input that drives the ac-
tuators. Such disturbances include noise and unmodeled
forces/dynamics, but also include potential attacks on the
control system. Actuator attacks1 enter on the communica-
tion from controller to actuator, effectively replacing the true
controller command with a different one. Sensor attacks1
similarly manipulate the measurement information passed
from the sensors to the controller. If feedback is employed
(which is most often the case), then this corrupted sensor
measurements will lead to corrupted input signals to the
actuator.
In this work, we study a generic model that captures
any attack that, directly or indirectly, propagates itself to
the input signal regardless of the specific mechanism (e.g.,
feedback law, etc). In particular, we characterize the set of
possible reachable states induced by individually-bounded
control inputs. We then consider imposing artificial bounds
to constrain this reachable set to avoid states that are harmful
to the system or unsafe. Because quantifying the exact
reachable set is not tractable, we turn to construct outer
ellipsoidal bounds on these reachable sets.
In a similar context, the authors in [18] developed tools
to quantify outer ellipsoidal bounds on the reachable set of
states for LTI systems with peak bounded input, where the
norm of input vector is bounded in aggregate, i.e., ‖uk‖ < γ
(in this paper ‖ · ‖ denotes Euclidian norm). We restate their
result before we build on it for this work.
Lemma 1: [18]. Let Vk be a positive definite function,
V1 = 0, and ζTk ζk ≤ κ ∈ R>0. If there exists a constant
a ∈ (0, 1) such that
Vk+1 − aVk − 1− a
κ
ζTk ζk ≤ 0, (3)
then, Vk ≤ 1.
III. RESULTS
From a theoretical viewpoint, if (F,G) is controllable, the
reachable set of (1) is the complete state space Rn – even
if arbitrarily large inputs are required to reach some states.
1These attacks can also be accomplished through the installation of
malware on the controller hardware.
However, actuators have practical limitations and as a result
the entire state-space is not reachable.
Our goal is to find an ellipsoids which encapsulates the
entire reachable set. We define these ellipsoids as:
E(P, α) := {x ∈ Rn | xTPx ≤ α} , (4)
where P ∈ Rn×n is a positive-definite matrix and α ∈ R>0
is a positive constant. When α = 1, we omit writing it out
explicitly, i.e., E(P, 1) = E(P ). We adapt the result in [18]
to help find these ellipsoids.
Lemma 2: Let Vk be a positive definite function, V1 = 0,
and [uk]2i ≤ γi, γi > 0, i = 1, . . . ,m. If there exists a
constant a ∈ (0, 1) such that
Vk+1 − aVk − (1− a)
m∑
i=1
[uk]
2
i
γi
≤ 0, (5)
then, Vk ≤ m.
Proof: We first simplify (5) bounding it using (2)
Vk+1 ≤ aVk + (1− a)
m∑
i=1
[uk]
2
i
γi︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤m
. (6)
Because of inequality (5), the following is satisfied
Vk ≤ aVk−1 + (1− a)m, (7)
substituting (7) in (5) and continuing the recursion yields
Vk ≤ aVk−1 + (1− a)m
≤ a [aVk−2 + (1− a)m] + (1− a)m
= a2Vk−2 + (1− a2)m
...
≤ ak−1V1 + (1− ak−1)m.
Since a ∈ (0, 1)1 and V1 = 0, Vk ≤ m for all k ≥ 1. 
A. Analysis
We can now employ Lemma 2 to derive an outer ellip-
soidal bound on the reachable set of (1) subject to known
individual actuator bounds (2). The reachable set we seek to
quantify is given by
R :=
{
xk ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣ xk+1 = Fxk +Guk, x1 = 0,[uk]2i ≤ γi, i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀k ∈ N
}
.
(8)
Notice that
m∑
i=1
[uk]
2
i
γi
= uTkRuk ≤ m, (9)
where the actuator bounds are collected in the matrix R,
R :=

1
γ1
0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 1γm
 . (10)
Remark 1: Note, from (8), that if for some k = k∗,
xk∗ 6= 0 and ρ[F ] > 1, where ρ[·] denotes spectral radius,
then ||xk|| diverges to infinity as k grows for any non-
stabilizing uk. That is, R is unbounded if the system is
open-loop unstable. If ρ[F ] ≤ 1, then ||xk|| may or may
not diverge to infinity depending on algebraic and geometric
multiplicities of the eigenvalues with unit modulus of F
(a known fact from stability of LTI systems), see [19] for
details.
Theorem 1: Consider the LTI system (1) with matrices
(F,G), the actuator bounds γi > 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, and matrix
R in (10). For given a ∈ (0, 1), if there exists a positive
definite matrix P ∈ Rn×n solution of the following convex
optimization:
min
P
− log detP,
s.t. P > 0, and[
aP − FTPF −FTPG
−GTPF (1− a)R−GTPG
]
≥ 0,
(11)
then, R ⊆ E(P,m) and the ellipsoid E(P,m) has minimum
volume.
Proof: For some positive definite matrix P ∈ Rn×n, let
Vk = x
T
k Pxk in Lemma 2. Substituting (1) and this Vk in
(5) yields
νT
[
aP − FTPF −FTPG
−GTPF (1− a)R−GTPG
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q
ν ≥ 0 (12)
where ν =
[
xTk , u
T
k
]T
. This inequality is satisfied if and
only if Q is positive semi-definite.
To ensure that the ellipsoid bound is as tight as possible,
we minimize (detP )−1/2 since this quantity is proportional
to the volume of xTk Pxk = m. We instead minimize
log detP−1 as it shares the same minimizer and because
for P > 0 this objective is convex [20]. 
Lemma 2 indicates that the solution to the optimization
problem (11) may exist for some values of the parameter
a ∈ (0, 1). Out of these values, we are interested in selecting
the one that leads to the ellipsoid with minimum volume. We
employ a straightforward grid search to find this value of a.
Remark 2: In the case in which all control inputs have
identical bounds, i.e., R = 1γ Im, with Im the m×m identity
matrix, the common scalar bound γ can be factored out of
the LMI in (12) by defining Pˆ = γP , then:
Q =
1
γ
[
aPˆ − FT PˆF −FT PˆG
−GT PˆF (1− a)Im −GT PˆG
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Qˆ
≥ 0. (13)
Since γ > 0, Qˆ ≥ 0 ⇔ Q ≥ 0. This implies that in the
case of common actuator bounds, the optimization can be
solved independent of the actual bound. After a solution Pˆ
satisfying Qˆ ≥ 0 in (13) is found, it is simply scaled by the
bound γ to recover the desired ellipse, i.e., R ⊆ E
(
1
γ Pˆ ,m
)
.
B. Synthesis
In most physical dynamical systems, actuator saturation
arises from physical limits. In the past section, Theorem 1
gives us the tools necessary to quantify the outer ellipsoidal
bounds for the reachable states according to such inherent
actuator bounds. In the context of security, it is intriguing
to impose artificial limits on actuators smaller than their
physical bounds to reduce the potential impact of attackers on
the behavior of the system. Such a design problem would be
informed by a region of state space D which is considered
unsafe. Such a region might represent states in which, for
example, the pressure of a holding vessel will exceed its
pressure rating or the level of a liquid in a tank exceeds its
capacity. Our aim is that, through the selection of new input
bounds, we can guarantee that the system would avoid these
dangerous states, not simply due to stabilizing controller
action, which might be hacked, but due to the imposed new
limits of the actuator action.
Thus, we aim here to design new bounds γˆi, i = 1, . . . ,m
such that the new reachable set bounding ellipsoid does not
overlap with the unsafe states. Corresponding to these new
bounds, we define the new rechable set Rˆ as:
Rˆ :=
{
xk ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣ xk+1 = Fxk +Guk, x1 = 0,[uk]2i ≤ γˆi, i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀k ∈ N
}
.
(14)
The dangerous state sets in many, if not most, practical
applications can be captured through the union of half-spaces
defined by their boundary hyperplanes:
D :=
{
x ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣
κ⋃
i=1
cTi x ≥ bi
}
, (15)
where each pair (ci, bi), ci ∈ Rn, bi ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , κ
quantifies a hyperplane that defines a single half-space.
Theorem 2: Consider the LTI system (1) with matrices
(F,G), the original actuator bounds γi > 0, i = 1, . . . ,m,
matrix R in (10), and a set D of dangerous states bounded by
the hyperplanes cTi x = bi, i = 1, . . . , κ. For given a ∈ (0, 1),
if there exist a positive definite matrix Y ∈ Rn×n and diago-
nal matrix Rˆ := diag(rˆ1, . . . , rˆm) ∈ Rm×m, rˆi > 0, solution
of the following convex optimization:
min
Rˆ,Y
tr(Rˆ),
s.t. Rˆ ≥ R, Y > 0,
cTi Y ci ≤
b2i
m
, for i = 1 . . . , κ,aY 0 Y FT0 (1− a)Rˆ GT
FY G Y
 ≥ 0,
(16)
then, the new actuator bounds γˆi := (1/rˆi), i = 1, . . . ,m,
enforce that D does not intersect with the new reachable set
Rˆ in (14) and maximize the volume of the new minimum-
volume ellipsoid E(Y −1,m) bounding Rˆ.
Proof: The minimum distance d between an ellipsoid
E(P,m) centered at zero and a hyperplane cTx = b is given
by the formula [21]
d =
|b| −
√
mcTP−1c√
cT c
. (17)
We aim to obtain the largest ellipsoid (in terms of volume)
that does not cross the hyperplane. This would maximize the
size of the reachable set restricted to not crossing into the
dangerous set. This is accomplished if we let the ellipsoid
and hyperplane to touch at a single point, i.e., for the distance
to be zero, which implies
cTP−1c =
b2
m
. (18)
Given the hyperplane parameters c and b, the choice of
P−1 that satisfies this relationship is then the largest ellipse
E(P,m) that does not overlap with the dangerous states. Note
that the zero-distance condition (18) is written in terms of
P−1 which is not linear in P . Thus, to maintain a tractable
convex semi-definite optimization problem, we write the
original analysis LMI Q in (12) in terms of Y := P−1
and the new matrix Rˆ. The new Q can be written as the
Schur complement of a higher dimensional matrix Q˜ such
that the positive semi-definiteness of Q˜ implies the positive
semi-definiteness of Q,
Q ≥ 0⇔ Q˜ =
aY −1 0 FTY −10 (1− a)Rˆ GTY −1
Y −1F Y −1G Y −1
 ≥ 0. (19)
Finally, multiplying Q˜ above from the left and right by the
following congruence transformation
Y :=
Y In
Y
 , (20)
results in the bottom LMI in (16).
The constraint (18) can be added for each hyperplane that
specifies the boundary of the dangerous set. Once multiple
hyperplanes specify the boundary, it is possible that the
ellipse cannot touch all boundaries simultaneously; therefore,
we relax each distance constraint into the inequality in (16)
(cTP−1c = cTY c ≤ b2m ). Taken together, these distance con-
straints ensure that the outer ellipsoidal bound of reachable
states does not extend beyond any of the hyperplanes. In or-
der to guarantee that we find the largest possible bounds, we
maximize a function of the bounds, or in this case minimize a
function of the diagonal elements of Rˆ (the trace of Rˆ). This
bound maximization coupled with the hyperplane boundaries
have the additional effect of ensuring the tightness ellipsoidal
bound (minimum volume) to the reachable set. This allows
us to omit the log detP−1 objective we use in Theorem 1
(which is not a convex objective with the decision variable as
Y = P−1). Maximizing the bounds first expands the ellipse
until it hits one or more hyperplanes. Then, continuing to
maximize the bounds maintains the same ellipsoid, however,
increases the tightness of the ellipsoid onto the reachable
states, until this cannot be improved. The restriction Rˆ ≥ R
is added to ensure that the new bounds are not larger than
the original physical bounds. 
A particular case in which a close-form expression for the
new actuator bounds can be obtained is when all the bounds
are designed to be equal, i.e., γˆi := γˆ ∈ R>0, i = 1, . . . ,m.
This is stated in the following corollary of Theorem 2.
Corollary 1: Let γmin := min(γi), i = 1, . . . ,m. For
given a ∈ (0, 1), if there exists a positive definite matrix
Pˆ ∈ Rn×n solution of the following convex optimization:
min
Pˆ
− log det Pˆ ,
s.t. Pˆ > 0, and[
aPˆ − FT PˆF −FT PˆG
−GT PˆF (1− a)Im −GT PˆG
]
≥ 0,
(21)
then, the new actuator bound:
γˆ := min
(
b2i
mcTi Pˆ
−1ci
, γmin
)
, i = 1, . . . ,m, (22)
enforce that D does not intersect with the new reachable set
Rˆ in (14) with γˆi = γˆ and maximize the volume of the new
minimum-volume ellipsoid E( 1γˆ Pˆ ,m) bounding Rˆ.
Proof: Because γˆi = γˆ, we have Rˆ = 1γˆ Im in (16). Applying
the congruence transformation Y−1 (with Y in (20)), the
Schur complement, and the change of variables P = Y −1
to the bottom LMI in (16), we get the equivalent inequality
1
γˆ
[
aPˆ − FT PˆF −FT PˆG
−GT PˆF (1− a)Im −GT PˆG
]
≥ 0,
with Pˆ = γˆP . Which is the bottom inequality in (21) scaled
by 1γˆ . This implies that for a solution Pˆ of (21), we can
simply scale Pˆ by the inversed new bound γˆ to recover the
desired ellipse, i.e., Rˆ ⊆ E( 1γˆ Pˆ ,m). Note that E( 1γ Pˆ ,m) is
a minimum-volume ellipsoid for any γˆ > 0 because E(Pˆ ,m)
is minimum-volume and both ellipsoids have the same shape
and orientation (i.e., the eigenvectors of P and Pˆ are the
same). Hence, to have a maximal minimum-volume ellipsoid,
we have to select γˆ to be the largest γˆ such that the dangerous
states are avoided. For this, as in Theorem 2, we use the
distance condition cTi Y ci = c
T
i P
−1ci = γˆcTi Pˆ
−1ci ≤ b
2
i
m ,
i = 1, . . . ,m. The largest γˆ satisfying the latter inequality
and being smaller than the smallest original physical bound
is given by γˆ in (22). 
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
To illustrate these results, we consider a linear 2×2 system
with two inputs
F =
[
0.84 0.23
−0.47 0.12
]
, G =
[
0.07 0.3
0.23 0.1
]
. (23)
The actuators of this system have physical limitations which
saturate the inputs at [uk]21 ≤ γ1 = 8 and [uk]22 ≤ γ2 = 10,
k ∈ N. These inherent bounds impose a reachable set of
states which are outer-bounded by an ellipse that is the
solution of Theorem 1. This ellipse is the blue ellipse in
-6 0 6
-5
0
5
-6 0 6
-5
0
5
Fig. 1. The solution of Theorem 1 provides the (blue) ellipsoid which outer-bounds the reachable set corresponding to the system driven by the original
physical input bounds γ = [8, 10]. A dangerous state set D, is defined by the single half-space cT1 x ≥ b1 and the solution of Theorem 2 provides the
bounds γ = [7.54, 5.14] and corresponding (purple) ellipsoid that outer-bounds the largest reachable set that avoids the dangerous state set. A second
half-space is added to D, cT2 x ≤ b2 and Theorem 2 again provides the bounds γ = [1.77, 0.76] and the (red) ellipsoid that outer-bounds the largest
reachable set that avoids both half-spaces. Corollary 1 can be used to derive equal bounds γ = [5.9, 5.9] and the corresponding (green) ellipsoid that
bound the reachable set that avoids the single half-space cT1 x ≥ b1. We show a Monte-Carlo simulation of many (10,000) trajectories to construct an
empirical reachable set according to the corresponding bounds, which demonstrates the tightness of the ellipsoidal bounds.
Fig. 1. This solution (and all others we present here) is
found using YALMIP, a MATLAB toolbox for optimization,
especially semidefinite programs (SDP), and the SDP solver
SeDuMi [22],[23]. As mentioned before, the parameter a is
incrementally varied over the range (0, 1) and the optimiza-
tion is solved at each value of a. The optimal solution must
first be a successful solution (for some values of a there is
no solution to the problem) and second must yield an ellipse
of minimum volume.
We now define a set of dangerous states that represent
states which jeopardize the safety and/or operation of the
system. Let D = D1 = {x | 0.1x1 + x2 ≥ 3}. It is
immediately apparent that the inherent bounds allow the
system to reach some of the dangerous states. Using Theorem
2, we can find new artificial bounds on the inputs so that the
system can no longer reach the danger states. We solve the
optimization for the purple ellipse in Fig. 1 corresponding
to bounds γ1 = 7.54 and γ2 = 5.14. This outer ellipsoidal
bound touches, but does not cross the hyperplane that defines
D1. Thus, following these new bounds, the system cannot
reach any of the dangerous states.
It is also possible to avoid the dangerous states while
enforcing equivalent artificial bounds on all inputs. Using
Corollary 1, we identify the ellipsoid Pˆ . Using (22), we find
the bound γ1 = γ2 = γ = 5.9 and the corresponding green
ellipsoid in Fig. 1. This ellipsoid (as well as the others above)
tightly bound the reachable set. We show this by plotting
an extensive Monte-Carlo simulation of 10,000 trajectories
(each of length 1000 steps) of the system with the bounds
γ1 = γ2 = γ = 5.9. This empirical reachable set is well
approximated by the outer bounding ellipsoid.
We further demonstrate that the formulation in Theorem
2 can handle a dangerous state set composed of the union
of multiple half-spaces. Let D = D1 ∪ D2, where D2 =
{x | −2x1 +x2 ≤ −2
√
5}. Theorem 2 with both half-space
constraints produces the bounds γ1 = 1.77 and γ2 = 0.76
along with the corresponding red ellipse in Fig. 1. Again
we demonstrate the tightness of this ellipsoidal bound by
plotting the empirical reachable set.
V. CASE STUDY: PLATOONING
In order to illustrate the viability of our analysis, we
consider the platooning problem depicted in Figure 2. In
particular, platooning offers many benefits over solo driving
such as better reaction times, decrease of CO2 emissions, and
lower fuel consumption [24]. The objective of the platoon
is to maintain an adequate distance between vehicles, such
that sudden changes in the leader’s speed (e.g., braking)
will not cause any crash in the preceding vehicles. This is
known as the string stability of the platoon and has been
widely studied in the literature [25], [26], [27]. Typically,
the Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) system controls the dis-
tance and/or relative velocity between adjoining vehicles by
measuring (radar/lidar) and reacting to the relative distance
and/or velocity between adjacent vehicles compared to a de-
sired setpoint. More recently, work has leveraged vehicle-to-
vehicle or infrastructure-to-vehicle communication to inject
feed-forward commands. Such Cooperative Adaptive Cruise
Control (CACC) systems improve the string stability of the
platoon and allows vehicles to follow each other with a
closer distance than with ACC, thereby improving traffic
flow capacity. CACC gathers information of vehicles further
in front according to a specific communication network
topology.
Let us consider a simplified discrete-time cruise control
Radar
Fig. 2. Scheme of a platoon of three vehicles. Each vehicle can sense
adjacent distances and speeds using radar/lidar. In addition, they are also
equipped with a CACC strategy using a, e.g., vehicle-to-vehicle, communi-
cation network. An adversary can gain access to some sensors or actuator
commands transmitted through the network.
model of a platoon with n vehicles as follows
d1,k+1 = d1,k + ∆t(v2,k − v1,k)
... (24)
dn−1,k+1 = dn−1,k + ∆t(vn,k − vn−1,k)
v1,k+1 = v1,k + β1v1,k + ∆tu1,k
... (25)
vn,k+1 = vn,k + βnvn,k + ∆tun,k (26)
where k ∈ Z+ is the sampling instant, di,k is the distance
between vehicle i + 1 and i for i = 1, . . . , n − 1, vj,k is
the speed of the jth vehicle, and uj,k is the control input
that changes the acceleration, for j = 1, . . . , n. ∆t is the
sampling period and βj < 0 is the velocity loss caused by
friction. For simplicity, let dk = [d1,k, . . . , dn−1,k], vk =
[v1,k, . . . , vn,k], and uk = [u1,k, . . . , un,k]. As depicted in
Fig. 2, the leader vehicle is indexed by n and the last vehicle
is index 1.
For our example, we consider a simple control strategy
that combines an ACC and a secondary control (e.g., CACC)
given by
ui,k = u˜i,k + wi,k(dk, vk),
where u˜i,k corresponds to a forward-and-reverse-looking
proportional-derivative control according to [28] of the form
u˜i,k = kp,i(−di−1,k + d∗i−1) + kp,i(di,k − d∗i )
+kd,i(vi−1,k − vi,k) + kd,i(vi,k − vi+1,k), (27)
to maintain a desired distance d∗i between vehicles and
wi,k(dk, vk) is the secondary control strategy that relies on
a communication network. However, as depicted in Figure
2, an adversary can intercept and modify that information
causing dangerous impacts such as making the vehicles
crash.
Because of the physical constraints in the accelera-
tion/deceleration of each vehicle, we assume that the sec-
ondary control action is bounded according to
wi ≤ wi,k ≤ w¯i. (28)
for wi < w¯i. As we mentioned above, we can impose virtual
constraints in control actions in order to avoid unsafe states.
A. Experiments
Suppose we have a platoon of three vehicles as depicted
in Fig. 2 where d∗i and v
∗ are the desired separation distance
and desired velocity, respectively. We can introduce a change
of variable d˜i,k = di,k − d∗i and v˜i,k = vi,k − v∗ without
affecting the dynamic model, such that d˜i,k = 0 implies that
the desired reference is achieved, i.e., di = d∗i . Therefore,
let xk = [d˜1,k, d˜1,k, v˜1,k, v˜2,k, v˜3,k]> such that
F =
[ 1 0 −∆t ∆t 0
0 1 0 −∆t ∆t
kp,1 0 (1 + β1) − kd,1 kd,1 0
−kp,2 kp,2 kd,2 (1 + β2) − 2kd,2 kd,2
0 −kp,3 0 kd,3 (1 + β3) − kd,3
]
,
G =
[
02×3
∆tI3
]
.
The dynamic system with the ACC and the secondary control
wk is of the form
xk+1 = Fxk +Gwk.
Notice that d˜i,k = −d∗i corresponds to the case when the
distance di,k = 0, which means that the pair of vehicles i
and i+ 1 have crashed. Since we want to avoid crashes, we
define the unsafe states as
D = {x ∈ Rn ∣∣ − x1 ≥ d∗1 ∪ −x2 ≥ d∗2} .
The simulation parameters are d∗i = d
∗ = 1 m, v∗ =
60 km/h, ∆t = 0.5 s, βi = −0.1, kp,i = 0.2, kd,i = 0.3. The
initial acceleration constraints are −w1 = w¯1 = 1.1 m/s2,
−w2 = w¯2 = 0.9 m/s2, and −w3 = w¯3 = 1.05 m/s2, such
that γ = (1.2, 0.8, 1.1) (the square of the absolute bounds).
Figure 3 illustrates the projection in the d˜1− d˜2 space of the
minimum volume ellipsoid that approximates the reachable
set using Theorem 1 for the given acceleration constraints.
However, notice that unsafe states may be reached and thus
there are inputs that can lead the vehicles to crash. Applying
Theorem 2, we are able to find the set of constraints that will
keep the reachable states outside of the dangerous states, as
depicted in Fig. 3. The new set of bounds (safe constraints)
is γ = (0.03, 0.05, 0.03), such that any sensor or actuator
attack that affects the control input will not be able to cause
the vehicles to crash.
Let us consider a simple CACC strategy of the form
wk = Kxk
where K is a LQR control gain. This control strategy drives
xk to 0 as k → ∞, such that the intervehicle distances and
velocities become di = 1 m and vj = 60 km/h for all i, j.
The CACC will gather information about vehicles position
and speed using wireless communications (e.g., vehicle-to-
vehicle) with full information, i.e., each vehicle has access
to all the states.
An adversary gains access to all CACC commands and in-
jects false data that suddenly forces acceleration/deceleration
of the vehicles. Fig. 4 depicts the distances and velocities
when the attack is launched after 25 s. Notice that with
the original bounds the oscillations provoke a crash between
vehicles 1 and 2, i.e., d1 = 0. On the other hand, imposing
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Fig. 3. Projection of the reachable set in the d˜1−d˜2 plane for the platooning
example with unsafe hyperplanes d˜i ≤ −1 for i = 1, 2. Notice that with
the original constraints the unsafe states can be reached, but imposing the
safe constraints obtained using our results ensures that no disturbance or
attack will drive the system to unsafe states.
the constraints that we found by applying Theorem 2, it is
possible to prevent the crash as depicted in Fig. 5. In fact,
any attack in sensors or actuators for any type of secondary
control is limited and cannot cause a vehicle crash. The cost
of these constraints can be observed in the convergence time.
Since the maximum acceleration is small, it takes longer to
reach the desired velocity; however, this makes possible to
avoid unsafe states.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have taken a new approach to limiting
the capabilities of an attacker by imposing artificial limits
on the control inputs that drive the system. Whether caused
by manipulation of the control inputs themselves, or an
indirect effect of sensor or system manipulations, these
actuator bounds restrict the states that can be reached. We
derive methods based on convex optimization to quantify
the reachable states given known actuator bounds and also
methods to design new bounds to avoid the reachable set
from entering a set of states determined to be unsafe or
dangerous. Through the example of a platoon, we show
how dangerous states can be determined (e.g., a crash of
adjacent vehicles) and avoided. Also, the platoon example
demonstrates that security through actuator bounds might
come at the cost of conventional performance metrics such
as settling time. In future work, we will analyze the balance
between stabilizing the system and securing it with the
proposed bounds.
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